Τρίτη, 20 Δεκεμβρίου 2016

PKK - 17 Νοέμβρη

Η παρακάτω μελέτη του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου έχει ένα case study για το κομμουνιστικό Κουρδικό PKK ( βλέπε σελίδα 50 “EuropeCrime Terror Nexus : A Case Study PKK”).



Η μελέτη γράφει ότι το PKK υποστηριζόταν κυρίως από το Ιράν και την Συρία μέχρι το 2002, αλλά από το 2002 και μετά τα δύο αυτά κράτη σταμάτησαν να το υποστηρίζουν και το PKK άρχισε να βασίζεται κυρίως στα δικά του έσοδα. Η μελέτη έχει γραφτεί το 2012 και δεν περιλαμβάνει τα τελευταία χρόνια με τις εξελίξεις στην Συρία, οπότε και το PKK είχε ξανά πολύ ισχυρή κρατική στήριξη (Ρωσία, Ιράν, Συρία).

Η μελέτη γράφει ότι το PKK λειτουργεί ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα δίκτυα ναρκωτικών, πορνείας και πλαστογραφίας στην Ευρώπη, και συνεργαζόταν στενά τα προηγούμενα χρόνια με την ETA και τον IRA. Να προσθέσω εγώ ότι η ETA και ο IRA ήταν δύο ακόμη οργανώσεις που λειτουργούσαν με τις ευλογίες της KGB, και το ίδιο ακριβώς συνέβαινε και με το PKK.

Να πω επίσης ότι μετά την συμφωνία Τουρκίας-Ρωσίας για τον Blue Stream  η Συρία αναγκάστηκε να διώξει τον Οτσαλάν, τον οποίο συνέλαβαν οι Τούρκοι στην Ελληνική Πρεσβεία με το Κυπριακό διαβατήριο. Και κακώς κατηγορούν τον Πάγκαλο οι πατριώτες του κώλου. Την στιγμή που τα είχαν συμφωνήσει η Τουρκία και η Ρωσία για τον Blue Stream και τον Οτσαλάν θα ήταν αυτοκτονία για την Ελλάδα να σηκώσει μπαϊράκι και να δώσει άσυλο στον Οτσαλάν.

Και μόνο που τον έπιασαν τον Οτσαλάν με Κυπριακό διαβατήριο στην Ελληνική πρεσβεία ήταν πολύ επικίνδυνο για την Ελλάδα. Φυσικά οι πατριδοκάπηλοι έσπευσαν να σηκώσουν τις Ελληνικές σημαίες και να σκίσουν τον Πάγκαλο για να πάρουν ψήφους. Ενώ δηλαδή η Τουρκία και η Ρωσία τα είχαν συμφωνήσει, και οι ΗΠΑ και ολόκληρη η ΕΕ θεωρούσαν το PKK τρομοκρατική οργάνωση, η Ελλάδα θα έπρεπε να κρύψει τον Οτσαλάν. Αυτό λένε. Πατριδοκάπηλοι.....Βέβαια ο χειρισμός ήταν εξευτελιστικός για την Ελλάδα. Ήταν ντροπή όλο αυτό που έγινε. Αλλά η κριτική θα έπρεπε να γίνει για τον χειρισμό και όχι για την ουσία.

Το PKK, η ΕΤΑ, ο IRA, οι Ερυθρές Ταξιαρχίες και η δική μας 17 Νοέμβρη λειτουργούσαν στο ίδιο δίκτυο, με υποστήριξη από την KGB, την Κούβα, τον Καντάφι, τον Αραφάτ, την FARC κλπ. Προφανώς και η 17 Ν είχε και υποστήριξη από την ΕΥΠ. Μπορεί να εκπαιδευόταν στα στρατόπεδα του Καντάφι, του Αραφάτ, του Κάστρο ή της FARC, αλλά αποκλείεται να μην είχε ενημέρωση και από αξιωματικούς της ΕΥΠ στα χτυπήματα στην Ελλάδα.

Άλλωστε λίγο μετά την συμφωνία για τον Blue Stream την έπιασαν και την 17Ν. Την ίδια σχεδόν περίοδο που έσβησε το PKK έσβηε και η 17Ν. Αν και ξαναζωντάνεψε τα τελευταία χρόνια με άλλα ονόματα. H 17N να θυμίσω δεν σκότωνε μόνο Αμερικανούς. Είχε χτυπήσει και Τούρκους, και προφανώς θα συνεργαζόταν με το PKK στο εμπόριο ναρκωτικών και όπλων.

Δυστυχώς γα την 17 Νοέμβρη δεν βρίσκεις τόσο πολλά άρθρα γιατί προφανώς θεωρείται β ή γ κατηγορίας και δεν πολυασχολούνται οι ειδικοι. Και δεν μπορώ να βρω κάτι που να επιβεβαιώνει ότι η 17Ν συνεργαζόταν με το PKK, ή ότι εκπαιδευόταν στα στρατόπεδα του Καντάφι και του Αραφάτ, αλλά είναι λίγο τι κάνει νιάου νιάου στα κεραμίδια.

Να θυμίσω ότι η Τσουδερού ως υφυπουργός εξωτερικών της κυβέρνησης Μητσοτάκη είχε κατηγορήσει για την 17Ν τον Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου και τους Τσίμα και Αλεξάκη από την ΕΥΠ. Βλέπε Wikipedia “Revolutionary Organization 17 November : Conspiracy Theories”


Αραφάτ-Καντάφι


Παπανδρέου - Αραφάτ

Παπανδρέου - Καντάφι


“Revolutionary Organization 17 November : Conspiracy Theories”
Some Greek officials considered Revolutionary Struggle (EA), the group that fired a Chinese-made RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade at the U.S. Embassy in Athens in January 2007, to be a spin-off of 17N. However, three self-admitted EA members arrested in April 2010 claimed that they were anarchists—a designation 17N rejected in its proclamations.[17] For many years, leading politicians of the right-wing New Democracy party, as well as the conservative press, falsely claimed that Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was the mastermind behind 17N. Virginia Tsouderou, who became Deputy Foreign Minister in the Mitsotakis government, and journalist Giorgos Karatzaferis (later the founder and leader of a right-wing party, LAOS) claimed that terrorism in Greece was controlled by Papandreist officers of Hellenic National Intelligence Service (the Greek security and intelligence service), and named Kostas Tsimas (the head of EYP) and Colonel Alexakis as two of the supposed controllers of 17N.[18] However, after 17N members were arrested, the only connection between the terrorist organization and PASOK was the fact that Dimitris Koufontinas was a member of PAMK (the PASOK high school students organization) and an admirer of Andreas Papandreou in his late teens.
Other writers have also claimed that 17N may have been a tool of foreign secret services. In December 2005, Kleanthis Grivas published an article in To Proto Thema, a Greek Sunday newspaper, in which he accused "Sheepskin", the Greek branch of GladioNATO's stay-behind paramilitary organization during the Cold War, of the 1975 assassination of Welch, as well as of the 2000 assassination of Saunders. This was denied by the US State Department, which responded that "the Greek terrorist organization '17 November' was responsible for both assassinations", and asserted that Grivas' central piece of evidence had been the "Westmoreland Field Manual," which the State Department, as well as a Congressional inquiry, had dismissed as a Soviet forgery. The State Department also highlighted the fact that, in the case of Richard Welch, "Grivas bizarrely accuses the CIA of playing a role in the assassination of one of its own senior officials" as well as the Greek government's statements to the effect that the "stay behind" network had been dismantled in 1988.[19]


Europe’ Crime Terror Nexus : A Case Study PKK”
The PKK provides a notable example of a crime-terror link and simultaneously demonstrates both how this interrelationship operates in Europe, and the profound social and economic impact it has on European nations. Although most of its financing until the late 1990s came from state sponsors (primarily Syria and Iran), the PKK’s criminal involvement is not a new phenomenon. Scholars noted that the PKK has had some involvement in OC as early as the 1980s.20 However, losing state sponsorship by 2002, the PKK increasingly turned to OC for financial support. As a terrorist organisation, the PKK’s chief targets are in Turkey; yet its’ criminal operations span across the Globe.21 According to Europol, the PKK’s criminal activities in Europe include drug and human trafficking, extortion and money laundering.22 The PKK has also been involved in cigarette and arms smuggling, counterfeit stamps and banknotes, and trafficking in blood products.23 Drug trafficking has become the PKK’s most profitable vehicle for terrorist financing with conservative estimates placing their annual income at €500 million. 24 According to investigations by the Turkish National Police (TNP), the PKK has been ‘extensively involved’ in every stage of the drug trade including extorted taxes on drug traffickers and OC syndicates, cannabis cultivation, coordinated drug trafficking along the Balkan Route, distribution in European markets, and laundered proceeds of the drug trade.25 Additionally, the organisation has been known to provide drug dealers with protection from security forces in exchange for a percentage of their profits.26 Cannabis, as noted by the TNP, is not only trafficked through the state, but also grown in the Kurdish regions of the country, which are used to fund their terrorist operations. In August 2010, Turkish authorities seized 65 kg of cannabis and 65 kg of explosives. Those arrested in the operation were charged with “carrying an explosive substance belonging to a terrorist organisation” and financing the PKK terror network.27 In November 2011, Turkish officials seized more than 44 tonnes of marijuana estimated at 28 million TL.28 More recent drug raids in Turkey revealed that the PKK has been using Colombian methods - laying mines and hand-made explosives on roads to produce ‘liberated crime zones’ - to protect drug fields.29 These methods may suggest that the PKK is simply learning the ‘tricks of the trade’; however, this may also reveal criminal links to drug cartels operating in South America. These links are highly likely (and have been noted in the past30); drug smugglers from South America have had known links to other terrorist organisations including North African criminal and terrorist networks, ETA and the IRA. Furthermore, the PKK has historical links to operatives in Hezbollah, which run operations in Europe, Lebanon, Panama and Colombia. Like the cannabis trade, the PKK has large criminal interests in heroin with extensive ties in trafficking from Afghanistan to the U.K. at nearly every stage. In October 2010 Turkish authorities arrested 10 individuals and seized 142 kg of heroin before the shipment could be transported to Europe. The investigation revealed that the PKK transported the narcotics from Afghanistan via Iran. The drugs were then delivered to various organisations across the Turkish border and then transported to Istanbul under the coordination of the PKK. Money was collected from a jewellery store in Yüksekova County where drivers were paid between 2,000 - 5,000 TL, and the remaining funds were given to the PKK. 31 From within Turkey, the PKK’s trafficking activities are interlinked with other Turkish OC networks, many of them ethnic Kurds. In 2009 it was reported that 138 Turkish networks controlled the heroin supply to Europe. 32 Trafficking operations in Turkey rely on clan networks and family relations that have prompted one Turkish security officer to note, “the cooperation between the PKK and Kurdish criminal clans has been similar to the cooperation among Sicilian mafia families.”33 This analogy, however, should not only note the relationship within OC elements, but also how criminal activity is tied to terrorist financing and support of the PKK. Often, individuals play an overlapping role in terms of organised crime and terrorist affiliations. Turkey acts mainly as a conduit for the transport of narcotics moving to Europe and therefore should not only be seen as an internal security threat but also, as Europol has noted “a significant impact on the internal security of the European Union."34 The PKK’s transit operations incorporate criminal gangs throughout the Middle East, Balkans and Europe. According to the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report published by the U.S. Department of State, Turkey is at a cross roads of three main heroin drug trafficking routes - the Balkan route, the northern (Black Sea) route and the eastern Mediterranean route.35 In other words, the PKK is not a lone operator; the organisation has multiple avenues and communication links with various other criminal networks. In July 2011 a joint U.S.-Romanian narco-terrorism undercover operation “identified Kurdish PKK members that were selling heroin to support their terrorist organisation.”36 In February of this year, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control designated three members of the PKK as narcotics traffickers; all three have direct ties to Moldovan and Romanian-based OC.37 The PKK’s active role in the drug trade (approximately 75% of heroin seized in Europe has a Turkish and Kurdish connection 38 ) suggests that the terrorist group and its criminal affiliates may have links to other criminal outlets along these routes, including but not limited to, their Russia counterparts in Cyprus and the Italian mafia in the Mediterranean. Turkish criminal organisations also have links throughout the Balkans, including Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina. The eventual incorporation of these nations into the E.U. will undoubtedly create easier access for drug trafficking into Europe; however, this also provides the opportunity for a more concerted and coordinated effort to eliminate or deter their criminal efforts. According to Turkey’s E.U. Affairs Minister Egemen Bagıs, the PKK runs “the largest human and illicit drug trafficking network in Europe.”39 It is estimated that the PKK is responsible for nearly 80 - 90% of heroin in Europe. 40 Within the E.U., the PKK has an extensive and sophisticated network to facilitate operations within the region. In 2010 French authorities arrested three suspects engaged in drug trafficking to finance the PKK cells in France. The investigation revealed that the three PKK militants were members of a large drug network operating in Turkey, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Spain.41 In April 2011 the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs added five PKK leaders as narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Of the five members, Remzi Kartal had extensive fundraising capabilities in Germany, Belgium and France.42 He had previously been arrested in Europe in 2005 and 2010 but released shortly after. Finally, the PKK and its affiliates have strong links to Germany and the U.K. According to one British official in 2006, "Turkish organised crime retains a tight control over the estimated 30 tons [of heroin] a year that feed into the U.K.”43 Addressing the PKK threat as solely a military issue in Turkey is likely to fail given its financial capabilities; “the organisation has shown considerable resilience over the past two decades, not least owing to its varied and sophisticated sources of financing.”44 Turkey’s success is highly dependent upon attacking the source of the PKK’s terrorist financing. However, in order to cut off financing a concerted effort should be taken in the field of OC and terrorism; it is simply counterproductive to view terrorism in one part of the world as disconnected from OC in another. As this case study details, the PKK operate an extensive criminal network throughout the E.U. and the outlying regions, and plays a pivotal role in financing its’ terrorist capabilities. Understanding the links between these two organisations and incorporating this approach into police and military operations on an international level can equip authorities with the tools necessary to combat OC and terrorism simultaneously.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201211/20121127ATT56707/20121127ATT56707EN.pdf

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